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Abstract. Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) is a well known cryptanalytic tech-
nique that exploits faulty outputs of an encryption device. Despite its popularity
and similarity with the classical Differential Analysis (DA), a thorough analysis
explaining DFA from a designer’s point-of-view is missing in the literature. To the
best of our knowledge, no DFA immune block cipher at an algorithmic level has been
proposed so far. Furthermore, all known DFA countermeasures somehow depend
on the device/protocol or on the implementation such as duplication/comparison.
As all of these are outside the scope of the cipher designer, we focus on designing
a primitive which can protect from DFA on its own. We present the first concept
of cipher level DFA resistance which does not rely on any device/protocol related
assumption, nor does it depend on any form of duplication. Our construction is
simple, software/hardware friendly and DFA security scales up with the state size.
It can be plugged before and/or after (almost) any symmetric key cipher and will
ensure a non-trivial search complexity against DFA. One key component in our DFA
protection layer is an SBox with linear structures. Such SBoxes have never been used
in cipher design as they generally perform poorly against differential attacks. We
argue that they in fact represent an interesting trade-off between good cryptographic
properties and DFA resistance. As a proof of concept, we construct a DFA protecting
layer, named DEFAULT-LAYER, as well as a full-fledged block cipher DEFAULT. Our
solutions compare favorably to the state-of-the-art, offering advantages over the
sophisticated duplication based solutions like impeccable circuits/CRAFT or infective
countermeasures.
Keywords. differential fault attack, protection, SBox, differential attack, DEFAULT
1 Introduction
Fault Attacks (FA) are considered strong implementation threats rendering many ciphers
vulnerable. Unlike classical cryptanalysis, which assumes no interference with the internal
operations of a cipher, in the case of FA the attacker has more control over the device
where the cipher is currently being executed. As a result, among other options, he is able
to suddenly alter an external input to the device (such as voltage level, EM radiation,
heat, etc.), forcing it to run under sub-optimal condition. This type of condition can
result in incorrect (faulty) output from the device. This faulty output may then help the
attacker to gain information about the secret key. FA gained much popularity among the
security/cryptography researchers and has been deployed to analyze a variety of ciphers.
When it comes to analyzing symmetric key cryptographic primitives, the most popular
choice for FA is generally the Differential Fault Analysis or Differential Fault Attack
(DFA) [15]. DFA is very powerful: almost all (if not all) block ciphers which are considered
secure with respect to classical attacks have been shown to be vulnerable to DFA. Note
that, to the best of our knowledge, no cipher has yet been designed to have a natural
DFA immunity, although there were no shortage of new cipher proposals or new DFA
countermeasures in recent years.
The crux of this situation is, as we observe, a lack of theoretical results towards designing
DFA-resistant primitives, akin to its classical counterpart, the Differential Analysis (DA).
Cipher designers have been very careful to design DA resistant ciphers, but not much
attention has been given to design a DFA-resistant cipher. Indeed, designing a DFA-
resistant cipher looks like a very difficult task as the attacker has enormous power in this
setting.
The usual DFA protections lie outside the domain of cipher design. At one end, some
device/protocol level technique is used, while at the other end, duplication based protection
is used (see Section 2.2 for more details). Duplication based countermeasures assume that
the fault can alter the execution within a predesignated boundary. Thereafter, a comparison
(which can be direct or with an error-detection code) between the two executions is used
to detect a fault. Since device/protocol level solutions are beyond the control of the cipher
designer, the best option to ensure DFA protection is duplication6. Given this scenario,
our work analyzes this problem and proposes a new type of solution, which is able to
ensure a non-trivial search complexity for the attack when using DFA, solely based on
the cipher construction itself. We use the basic design strategy and components of the
lightweight block cipher GIFT-128 [11] and thus manage to keep our design within low-cost
performance figures. Note that the DFA protection mechanism could be costly and that
our design does not need duplication or any protocol level countermeasure, we believe our
work opens up a new genre of low-cost DFA countermeasure.
Our Contributions. In this work, in order to offer natural DFA protection, we explore
the potential offered by the SBox, one of the basic building blocks of symmetric-key
cryptography algorithms. As the SBox is generally the only non-linear component in a
cipher, it is naturally vulnerable to DFA (as DFA does not work on a linear component,
whereas it works very well on a non-linear one). In a nutshell, strong linearity makes it hard
to attack a cipher with DFA, but too much linearity will of course render a cipher either
insecure or not efficient. The designer’s goal is therefore to try to find a good trade-off.
Since a secure cipher cannot be constructed by using only linear components, we
naturally focus on finding a building block that is somewhat in the middle ground between
an SBox and a linear function. Unsurprisingly, the middle ground lies in a weak class of
SBoxes, whose members behave like a linear function in some aspects, more precisely by
allowing the presence of so-called Linear Structures (LS). Such SBoxes have properties
which are generally considered undesirable for a cipher construction, which leads to a
paradoxical situation: an SBox which is more resistant against differential attacks is weaker
against DFA, while those which are more resistant against DFA are considered weaker
against differential attacks.
To circumvent this situation, we propose to maintain the main cipher to be protected
(which is presumably secure against classical attacks) untouched, but to add two keyed
permutations as additional layers before and after it, respectively. These keyed permutations
present a special structure that renders DFA non-trivial on them, naturally allowing the
entire construction to be DFA resistant. Indeed, assuming a certain fault model for DFA,
the attacker has to attack the first or last rounds of the overall cipher to make the attack
work. At the same time, the classical security of the construction, which is guaranteed by
the main cipher, will not be hampered.
6It may still be argued that duplication based protections cannot be guaranteed at the cipher
design level, and hence off-limit to a cipher designer.
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To validate our claims, we propose an SPN-based construction of a 128-bit keyed
permutation L, DEFAULT-LAYER, using a 4 × 4 SBox that contains 3 LS. We show that
this keyed permutation can provide safeguard against DFA up to a non-trivial search
complexity (2n/2 for an n-bit block cipher). DEFAULT-LAYER is hardware/software friendly
and any variant of L with a multiple of 16-bit can be constructed (we recommend it to
be at least 128-bit). As the DFA security scales up with the size of L (which does not
happen for classical ciphers), if a 256-bit variant of L is used it will effectively provide a
DFA security of (at least) 2128 computations. In fact, by playing with the number of LS in
the SBox chosen, it is even possible to find trade-offs that go beyond 2n/2 security.
The idea of our keyed permutation is then extended to a complete SPN-based cipher
DEFAULT. It uses a specially crafted component DEFAULT-CORE (which does not have security
against DFA) between two DEFAULT-LAYER instances (to provide DFA security), in a hope
of overall improved performances compared to a full-fledged cipher sandwiched between
two DEFAULT-LAYER blocks. Indeed, DEFAULT-CORE will provide the extra classical security
that is lacking with only two DEFAULT-LAYER instances.
Using duplication on GIFT-128 cipher, either in the spatial or the temporal domain,
as a reference countermeasure for benchmarking (as duplication is a widely adopted
fault protection method in commercial products), we note that DEFAULT incurs similar
overheads, both in hardware and software. Yet, DEFAULT has the advantage of resisting
a higher number of faults when compared to duplication. In retrospect, our solution can
be considered lightweight compared to more sophisticated duplication countermeasures
(such as infection or error-detecting codes). Infective countermeasures can have ≈ 3× cost
increase when compared to the basic implementation [10]. Moreover, we note that the
recent block cipher CRAFT [14] and FRIET [41] based on error detection codes, leads to a
2.45× overhead when protecting against single bit faults at the output and scales even
higher for protecting against more faults. CRAFT is proposed as a block cipher with fault
protection as a prime target, designed with carefully chosen components that incur lower
overhead when protected with error detection codes. FRIET is proposed as a permutation
with built-in fault detection based on error-detection code (like parity-check). DEFAULT, on
the other hand, explores an alternative methodology to design a cipher with natural DFA
resistance and is not limited to a specific number of faults.
As an independent contribution, we also study how to model a cipher which has an SBox
with linear structures when searching for differential and linear bounds using automated
tools.
Outline. We give some background on DFA, explain our fault model and provide prelim-
inaries on SBoxes properties and notations in Section 2. Then, we explain how SBoxes
with linear structures can provide some DFA resistance in Section 3. We describe our DFA
protection component DEFAULT-LAYER and our entire cipher proposal DEFAULT (based on
DEFAULT-CORE) in Section 4. The rationale behind the cipher structure and components
is provided in Section 5, while detailed DFA and classical cryptanalysis is performed in
Section 6, MILP modeling in Section 7. Finally, implementations and benchmarks of our
designs are given in Section 8 and we conclude in Section 9.
2 Background and Preliminaries
2.1 Differential Fault Attacks in a Nutshell
As already mentioned, DFA is closely related to DA. In a classical DA, a difference is
introduced in plaintexts (resp., ciphertexts) at the beginning of the cipher encryption
(resp. decryption). Detecting the expected output difference requires large amount of data,
where the data complexity is inversely proportional to the differential probability. Cipher
designers often prove security against DA by showing that the probability of any differential
trail is too low for launching a DA.
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In comparison, in DFA the input difference is inserted in the form of a transient fault
and can be applied anytime during the course of the encryption/decryption. In practice,
faults are injected near the end of the cipher execution, effectively bypassing most of
the rounds designed to resist DA when compounded. This difference propagates through
only a handful of non-linear components, and based on the output differential value, the
adversary is able to reduce the key search space significantly.
The cryptanalysis procedure in DFA consists of two orthogonal terms, namely, fault com-
plexity (the number of faulty encryptions) and search complexity (computational/memory
complexity required). The general trend is to reduce the fault complexity while keeping
the search complexity within an acceptable limit.
2.2 Differential Fault Attack Protections
The state-of-the-art DFA countermeasures can be broadly classified into the following
categories [7]:
1. A separate, dedicated device that detects (and takes precaution) [26] or a shield that
blocks any potential source of a fault.
2. The underlying communication protocol between Alice and Bob ensures that a fault
does not occur with a significant probability. This can be ensured, e.g., by assuming a
small portion of the circuit is protected by other means [8].
3. Duplicate the cipher execution followed by implicit/explicit check for the equality of
the executions, so-called duplicated computations. One may refer to [10] for a study of
such countermeasures. Redundancy at the component level may also be introduced,
possibly with error detection/correction codes [3].
4. Use mathematical solutions to render DFA ineffective/inefficient.
One may notice that the countermeasures in above-mentioned categories 1 and 2 are
basically engineering solutions and generally outside the scope of cryptography design. In
a slight contrast, category 3 is somewhat close to what a cipher designer can specify. Yet,
identical faults in the duplicated computations will result in no differences between the
outputs and treated as if no fault is injected. This tricks the countermeasure to release
the faulty output, and works against state-of-the-art countermeasures like infection [10].
Although relatively hard to achieve in practice, this type of attack was shown to be feasible
in [40] and we refer to it as duplicate fault. While the device could be protected by using
different encodings for the two executions of the cipher, such methods usually add additional
performance cost. We also mention that sophisticated duplication countermeasures may
require additional components as well as an external source of randomness [10].
Our work falls under category 4, together with countermeasures like impeccable cir-
cuits [3]/CRAFT [14] and FRIET [41]. The authors of [3] proposed an efficient DFA protection
mechanism based on error detection codes and this idea was later extended to a block ci-
pher, named CRAFT. CRAFT employs error detection codes, which have different performance
figures and fault coverage depending on the underlying code. Any fault injection that
successfully alters the output beyond the detectable bound will make the DFA protection
of CRAFT ineffective. In comparison, our construction is free from such limitation (more
details in Section 6.4).
2.3 Our Claim
Novel Idea against DFA. At a higher level, most of the countermeasures, including
CRAFT, FRIET and duplicated computation, aim at fault detection which could be fooled by
stronger equipment that makes the faults go undetected. In comparison, we aim at fault
resilience7, meaning we allow the faults to propagate and even output faulty ciphertexts,
but the amount of information that an adversary can learn from them is limited: we impose
7The term “fault injection resilience” was first introduced in [25].
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a lower bound on the search complexity of DFA. Even with stronger equipment access, an
adversary cannot overcome the lower bound of the search complexity. In addition, our
design is completely at the algorithmic level, scalable, can be applied to existing ciphers
and does not require an additional source of randomness. These features make our proposal
different from infection-like countermeasures [10] which further corrupt the injected faults
and need a source of randomness for a provable security [12].
Analysis Methods. Instead of enumerating the various fault models and fault attacks,
we consider how an attack gains sensitive information, i.e., the analysis method. We can
broadly categorise the analysis methods into two types:
1. Deduce information from the differential values of the executions.
2. Deduce information from the statistical bias of the executions.
The fundamental reason why our design increases the search complexity of DFA is due
to the larger number of solutions for any given differential (details in Section 3). Hence,
for attacks that gain information from the differential values (analysis method 1), it is
not going to be as effective. We believe that our design could actually provide protection
beyond DFA. In a broader sense:
Our design can protect against DFA and any form of FA that deduces information from
the differential values of the executions.
Other attacks that exploit information leakages from statistical biases under analysis
method 2 are beyond our focus. We provide more discussions in Section 6.5.
2.4 Difference Distribution Table and Related Properties
A Difference Distribution Table (DDT) is an analysis table used in DA. For an n× n SBox
S, it is basically the 2n × 2n matrix, where the row δ (= 0, 1, . . . , 2n − 1) and column
∆ (= 0, 1, . . . , 2n − 1), denoted as DDTS [δ,∆], stores the number of solution(s) x for
S(x)⊕ S(x⊕ δ) = ∆. Notice that DDTS [0, 0] = 2n as S(x)⊕ S(x⊕ 0) = 0 holds for all x.
The maximum entry at the DDT of S, except the case δ = ∆ = 0, is called the Differential
Uniformity (DU).
In order for an SBox to be better resistant against DA, the (non-zero) maximal values
in the DDT have to be small, otherwise DA will be more effective. Thus, symmetric-key
cryptography designers almost exclusively look for SBoxes which have smaller values in
the DDT. However, the situation for DFA is completely opposite. Here, if the (non-zero)
DDT values are small, then the attacker has fewer solutions for the unknown input when
collecting faulty outputs. Thus, he is able to narrow down the search space more efficiently:
a DDT with smaller (non-zero) values will make the DFA easier. Hence, we see that the
strategy to thwart DA is exactly opposite to that of DFA. This paradoxical situation is
among the challenges to build a cipher level DFA protection.
We call SBoxes S1 and S2 Affine Equivalent (AE) if there exist two affine permutations
A1 and A2 such that S2 = A1◦S1◦A2. AE SBoxes have the same DDT up to a permutation.
Therefore, differential uniformity is invariant under affine equivalence, so are the other
cryptographic properties like non-linearity, algebraic degree, etc. It is to be noted that the
affine equivalence classification of all 4× 4 SBoxes has been completed already — there are
302 such classes. We follow the class representative SBoxes given in [20, Chapter 5.4.2]. For
a more compact representation, an element α ∈ Fn2 will be denoted by its corresponding
integer value from [0, 2n − 1].
Definition 1 (Sα〈δ〉). For the SBox S, the fault δ and the value α, the set of solutions
of the equation S(x)⊕ S(x⊕ δ) = S(α)⊕ S(α⊕ δ) is the set Sα〈δ〉.
Notice that, both α and α⊕ δ ∈ Sα〈δ〉. Basically, the cardinality of Sα〈δ〉 gives the entry
of the DDT at the δth row which contains α, which is at the column ∆ = S(α)⊕ S(α⊕ δ).
By applying fault δ, the attacker cannot identify α from other elements which belong to
Sα〈δ〉.
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δ=1 Sα〈δ〉 6= {α};
t where t = min k such that
⋂k
i=1 Sα〈δi〉 = {α}.
Hence MinFS(α) = −1 means, no matter what fault values that an attacker chooses,
he will be left with more than one choice for α. Also notice that, if MinFS(α) 6= −1, then
it must be ≥ 2.
Definition 3 (MinFS). Given an n× n SBox S, MinFS is defined as:
MinFS =
{
max0≤α≤2n−1 MinFS(α) if MinFS(α) 6= −1, ∀α ∈ {0, 1 . . . , 2n − 1};
−1 otherwise.
The subscript S is dropped if understood from context.
The interpretation of MinFS can be stated as: given an SBox S, it is the lower bound
on the number of faults required to uniquely solve any input.
Definition 4 (Linear Structure). For F : Fn2 → Fn2 , an element a ∈ Fn2 is called a
linear structure of F if for some constant c ∈ Fn2 , F (x)⊕ F (x⊕ a) = c holds ∀x ∈ Fn2 .
Note that the set of all linear structures of F denoted as L(F ) forms a subspace of Fn2 and
is termed as the linear space of F . If F : Fn2 → Fn2 has a (non-zero) linear structure then
2n becomes an entry in the corresponding DDT. In that case DU = 2n, thus F performs
worst against differential attacks compared to all F ’s that do not have a (non-zero) linear
structure.
Definition 5 (Coordinate Function and Component Function). Suppose F : Fn2 →
Fn2 is defined as F (x) = (f0(x), . . . , fn−1(x)) for all x ∈ Fn2 , where fi : Fn2 → F2 for
i = 0, . . . , n− 1. Then each fi is called a coordinate function of F . Furthermore, the linear
combinations of fi’s are called the component functions of F .
Definition 6 (Non-linearity). The non-linearity of the Boolean function f : Fn2 → F2 is
the minimum distance of f to the set of all affine functions. Furthermore, the non-linearity
of F : Fn2 → Fn2 is the minimum of the non-linearities of all the component functions of F .
3 Characterizing SBoxes in View of DFA
From now on, we implicitly assume that neither δ or ∆ is 0 and that an SBox S is a
permutation. We denote ∆(α, δ) the output difference for input value α and input difference
δ.
Theorem 1. Let S(x) ⊕ S(x ⊕ δ) = ∆(α, δ) have a solution x = α. Further, let a be a
(non-zero) linear structure of S. Then, (α⊕a) is also a solution of S(x)⊕S(x⊕δ) = ∆(α, δ),
i.e., the coset α⊕ L(S) is a subset of solutions of S(x)⊕ S(x⊕ δ) = ∆(α, δ). So, MinFS
= −1.
Proof. As a is a linear structure of S, we have that S(x)⊕ S(x⊕ a) is constant. Taking
derivative with respect to δ, ∀x we get S(x)⊕S(x⊕a)⊕S(x⊕ δ)⊕S(x⊕a⊕ δ) = 0. Using
x = α, S(α)⊕ S(α⊕ δ)⊕ S(α⊕ a)⊕ S(α⊕ a⊕ δ) = 0 =⇒ S(α⊕ a)⊕ S(α⊕ a⊕ δ) =
S(α)⊕S(α⊕δ) = ∆(α, δ). Hence, (α⊕a) is also a solution of S(x)⊕S(x⊕δ) = ∆(α, δ). ut
Theorem 1 gives an interesting insight regarding DFA resistance in SBoxes. If an SBox
has a (non-trivial) linear structure, then it is not possible to find the input to the SBox
just by analyzing the effect of faults, no matter how many faults are injected. In such
cases, the attacker has to search exhaustively among the set of solutions to find the proper
input. This increases the search complexity associated with DFA.
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Lemma 1 (Converse of Theorem 1). For the input α to S, if α⊕ a is a solution of
S(x)⊕ S(x⊕ δ) = ∆(α, δ) for all input differences δ, then a (6= 0) is a linear structure of
S.
Remark 1. Theorem 1 and Lemma 1 are valid for all (non-trivial) linear structure(s) of
S. In other words, the larger the number of (non-trivial) linear structures, the larger the
number of candidates that will be in the intersection of solution sets of all faults.
Lemma 2. Suppose S1 and S2 are two n× n SBoxes having `1 and `2 linear structures
(including the trivial linear structure 0) respectively, then the 2n× 2n SBox (S1, S2) will
have `1`2 linear structures (including the trivial linear structure (0, 0)).
Lemma 3. Suppose F : Fn2 → Fn2 to be any function and L : Fn2 → Fn2 to be linear. Then
L ◦ F and F have the same number of linear structures.
Theorem 2. Assume that the SBox S does not have any (non-zero) linear structure and
that S(x)⊕ S(x⊕ δ) = ∆(α, δ) has exactly 2m+ 2 solutions. Then there exist m+ 2 faults
{δ, δ′, δ1, . . . , δm} such that the system of equations
S(x)⊕ S(x⊕ δ) = ∆(α, δ),
S(x)⊕ S(x⊕ δ1) = ∆(α, δ1),
S(x)⊕ S(x⊕ δ′) = ∆(α, δ′),
. . . , S(x)⊕ S(x⊕ δm) = ∆(α, δm)
has a unique solution. Hence, MinFS(α) ≤ m+ 2.
From Theorem 2, we see that it is possible to uniquely recover the input/output value
of each SBox with no more than DUS/2 + 1 faults (unless there is a linear structure) when
attacking the last round. This gives a provable upper bound on the number of faults the
attacker needs per SBox (if faults values are judiciously chosen) in order the find out its
input uniquely, given that the SBox does not have a linear structure.




Remark 2. Although it is theoretically possible, we could not find any 4-bit SBox with
MinFS = 3 (refer to Corollary 1). Whether or not this is a tight bound is left open for
future research.
The proof for the Lemmas and Theorems can be found in Appendix A, together with
other relevant results and examples.
Remark 3. Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 give another interesting view-point: if an unkeyed SPN
permutation is constructed by repeating an SBox with l LS m times (in each round), then
the total number of linear structures for the super SBox (which is the round function) is
lm.
In order to better visualize the effect of DFA security with respect to the number of
linear structures for SPN ciphers (for a given SBox size), we present detailed information
in Table 1 for varying state sizes8. Note that the last cases (i.e, a 4× 4 SBox with 4 and
an 8× 8 SBox with 128 linear structures) is the theoretical limit for DFA protection (as
any more LS would imply that the SBox is linear). Hence, in theory we can achieve DFA
security up to 264 (for a 128-bit state) or 2128 (for a 256-bit state) using 4-bit SBoxes; and
2112 (for a 128-bit state) or 2224 (for a 256-bit state) using 8-bit SBoxes. As a proof of
concept, our instantiation of this DFA protection layer will use a 4-bit SBox with 4 LS
(which can provide DFA security of 264 computations) and it is described in Section 4.
8DFA security refers to the remaining key search complexity after the fault(s) have been
injected.
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Table 1: DFA security for SPN ciphers depending on the number of linear structures in the SBox.
Our design DEFAULT-LAYER will use a 4× 4 SBox with 4 linear structures for a state size of 128
bits, hence ensuring a 264 DFA security.























4 Construction of DFA Resistant Layer and Cipher
With the background given in Section 2, we first look at the problem of maximizing the
fault complexity. Note that fault complexity is the highest when the fault is injected at
the last round. Usually, for an SPN block cipher, three faults per SBox are sufficient as
most block ciphers use an SBox with DU = 4 (except for GIFT SBox [11], where DU is
6). In fact, in many cases, only two faults are needed to solve for any input. For example,
for the SBoxes chosen in AES [35], PRESENT [16], SKINNY-64 [13] and GIFT [11], the fault
values {1, 6} are sufficient to retrieve all inputs uniquely. Thus, it seems hard to force the
fault complexity to increase significantly.
4.1 Ad-hoc DFA Protection Layer (DEFAULT-LAYER)
Our approach is to tackle the problem of increasing the search complexity instead. This
means that we give the attacker the power to apply as many faults as he wants in total,
but the search space for the analysis should remain very large. As we already pointed
out (Theorem 1), if an SBox S has non-zero linear structure(s), then the attacker will
not be able to uniquely identify the input. Thus, he has to enumerate the remaining key

















Fig. 1: Main cipher augmented by DEFAULT-LAYER to resist DFA
Now, using an SBox with a linear structure is generally considered undesirable for a
block cipher design, as it makes the classical differential attacks easier (as explained in
Section 2.4). Hence, we arrive at a paradoxical situation: if we want to design a cipher with
better resistance against DFA, it becomes weak against classical attacks; and vice-versa. In
order to find a middle ground, where the cipher is strong against both DFA and classical
attacks, we propose the concept of prepending/appending an extra layer (that uses SBoxes
with linear structures) to the underlying cipher (henceforth referred to as “main cipher”).
Figure 1 visually represents the idea. The layer L, which we name as DEFAULT-LAYER
and describe in Section 4.3, is prepended and appended to the main cipher E, as in
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Figure 1(a). For decryption, L−1 is both prepended and appended to the main cipher
inverse (shown in Figure 1(b)), since the ciphertext C = L ◦E ◦ L(P ), and the decryption
L−1 ◦ E−1 ◦ L−1(C) = (L−1 ◦ E−1 ◦ L−1) ◦ (L ◦ E ◦ L)(P ) = P . The idea is that the
underlying cipher E will have desirable protection against classical attacks, while the
additional layer L will be used to thwart DFA. Since for DFA the attacker has to slowly
peel off the outer rounds of the cipher, we only have to protect these rounds against DFA,
while the inner cipher will provide all the security we expect from a block cipher in the
black-box model (adding a layer L will not weaken its security).
As we assume the attacker can target both the encryption and decryption processes,
the model described here can thwart DFA on both. If we assume a constrained model
for the attacker, for example where the decryption is done at a server which is physically
protected such that it cannot be accessed (as in [8, Section III]), then the prepended layer
L in Figure 1(a) and the appended layer L−1 in Figure 1(b) can be removed, which will
result in better performance.
4.2 Extension to a Full-Fledged Cipher (DEFAULT)
Aside from an ad-hoc layer which is able to protect any cipher from DFA, it is also
possible to construct a full-fledged block cipher. This is done by sandwiching the so-
called DEFAULT-CORE (this is another keyed permutation described in Section 4.4) with
DEFAULT-LAYER. The DEFAULT-CORE contains an SBox that is especially resistant to classical
linear attacks, and DEFAULT-LAYER uses an SBox that contains linear structures to resist
DFA and its variants. Hence DEFAULT consists of 2 components (for both the encryption
and decryption), as can be seen in Figure 1(a), replacing E with DEFAULT-CORE.
DEFAULT-CORE also follows a construction similar to GIFT-128, but we do not reuse
GIFT-128 permutation exactly as core permutation because we want to maximize the
security against linear attacks, even if that results in relatively low security against
differential attacks (which will be partially provided by the DEFAULT-LAYER layers anyway).
Thus, we do not use LS SBox, but in contrary we will use an SBox with excellent linear
approximation table (LAT) properties.
Therefore, the advantage of using DEFAULT instead of simply a classical cipher protected
with DEFAULT-LAYER layers, is that since DEFAULT-CORE has been designed to be especially
strong against linear attacks, we can reduce the number of cryptographic operations globally.
In other words, we believe DEFAULT strikes a better balance in terms of security/efficiency,
while using a classical cipher with DEFAULT-LAYER probably comes with some performance
overkill (DEFAULT-LAYER will provide extra differential attack resistance on top of the main
cipher, which was not needed since the cipher is assumed to be secure already).
4.3 Construction of DEFAULT-LAYER
We detail the 128-bit version of our proposed DFA protecting layer (DEFAULT-LAYER). It
can be used to protect 128-bit block ciphers, but we emphasize that it can be adapted to
any block size that is a multiple of 16.
DEFAULT-LAYER is a 28-round keyed permutation9 that receives a 128-bit message as the
state X = b127b126 . . . b0, where b0 is the least significant bit, and a 128-bit key. The state
can also be expressed as X = w31‖w30‖...‖w0, where wi is a 4-bit nibble word. We do not
describe the inverse layer here for the sake of brevity, but it can be trivially derived. The
round function (denoted by R henceforth) of DEFAULT-LAYER consists of 4 steps (in order):
SubCells — applying a 4-bit SBox to the state, PermBits — permute the bits of the state
(same as in GIFT-128 [11]), AddRoundConstants — XORing a 6-bit constant as well as
another bit to the state (same as in GIFT-128), and AddRoundKey — XORing the round
key to the state. A graphical representation of two consecutive rounds of DEFAULT-LAYER
is given in Appendix C.
9We avoid calling it a “cipher” as it is a DFA protecting layer used on top of an actual cipher.
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SubCells. It uses the 4-bit LS SBox S = 037ED4A9CF18B265. This SBox is applied to
every nibble of the state: wi ← S(wi), ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , 31}.
PermBits. The bit-permutation is the same as the permutation P128 in GIFT-128 (see
Appendix C), which maps bits from bit position i of the internal state to bit position
P128(i): bP128(i) ← bi, ∀i ∈ {0, ..., 127}.
AddRoundConstants. A single bit “1” and a 6-bit round constant C = c5c4c3c2c1c0 are
XORed into the cipher state at bit position 127, 23, 19, 15, 11, 7 and 3 respectively:
w127 = w127 ⊕ 1, w23 = w23 ⊕ c5, w19 = w19 ⊕ c4, w15 = w15 ⊕ c3. Table 2 shows the
round constants (6-bit) for DEFAULT-CORE and DEFAULT-LAYER. At each round the value is
encoded into a 6-bit word and XORed to the cipher state, with c0 being the least significant
bit.
Table 2: Round constants for DEFAULT
Round Constants ]
DEFAULT-CORE 1, 3, 7, 15, 31, 62, 61, 59, 55, 47, 30, 60, 57, 51, 39, 14, 29, 58, 53, 43, 22, 44, 24, 48, 33, 2, 5, 11 28
DEFAULT-LAYER 1, 3, 7, 15, 31, 62, 61, 59, 55, 47, 30, 60, 57, 51, 39, 14, 29, 58, 53, 43, 22, 44, 24, 48 24
AddRoundKey. A round key k is bitwise XORed to the state: bi ← bi⊕ kji ,∀i ∈ {0, ..., 127}.
Key Schedule. The 128-bit master key K is used to generate four 128-bit subkeys K0,
K1, K2 and K3 as follows: K0 = K and Ki+1 = R′(R′(R′(R′(Ki)))) for i ∈ [0, 1, 2], where
R′ denotes the R round function with no AddRoundKey layer and with the AddRound
Constants layer changed to only XORing a single bit “1” at bit position 127. Alternatively,
R′ can be seen as the R function with an all-zero round key and an all-zero round constant.
Then, these four subkeys are used to generate the round keys as follows: for round i with
i ≥ 0, the subkey Ki mod 4 is used as round key input for AddRoundKey.
4.4 Construction of DEFAULT-CORE (and DEFAULT)
In order to design the full-fledged cipher, we need to describe the middle part of the
cipher (DEFAULT-CORE), for which the SBox does not have any (non-zero) linear structure.
The design of the core is much alike to the DEFAULT-LAYER (hence omitted here for the
sake of brevity), except for the SBox, and it has 24 rounds. The SBox of choice here is
196F7C82AED043B5, based on its very desirable cryptographic properties against linear
attacks (see Section 7.2 for details). In a nutshell, the overall design of DEFAULT consists of:
DEFAULT-LAYER (28 rounds), followed by DEFAULT-CORE (24 rounds), followed by another
DEFAULT-LAYER (28 rounds). Hence DEFAULT is an SPN block cipher with heterogeneous
round structure, consisting of 80 rounds. Therefore, in comparison with time-duplicated
GIFT-128 (which contains 80 rounds in total), DEFAULT has the same number of rounds. As
for the round counter, we use the same from GIFT-128, which is refreshed at the beginning
of DEFAULT-LAYER/DEFAULT-CORE. More description (such as test vectors) for DEFAULT
can be found in Appendix B.
5 Design Rationale
The goals of our DEFAULT-CORE/DEFAULT-LAYER designs are clear: (1) to protect against
DFA, (2) applicable to different state sizes as well as to wide variety of symmetric key
ciphers, and (3) simple and lightweight. During its design, various choices have been made
and we discuss those here.
5.1 Design Philosophy
SPN vs Feistel network. Our first decision was to choose between SPN and Feistel
network. Although implementing the inverse of Feistel construction is simple and does not
require the inverse of its f -function, the non-linearity is introduced to only half of its state
in each round and hence usually requires more rounds (though lighter rounds) to achieve
the desired security margin. On the other hand, SPN introduces non-linearity to the entire
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state and thus requires lesser rounds in general. Study is also simpler, so we chose to start
with SPN.
Bit Permutation vs Rotational-XOR Diffusion vs Word-mixing Diffusion. For
SPN constructions, the diffusion layer is usually either a bit permutation (like in PRESENT
and GIFT), a rotational-XOR layer (like in SMS4 [21], ASCON [23]), or a word-mixing diffusion
(like in AES and SKINNY). Although the latter two provide a stronger diffusion, they can
be costly in hardware and non-trivial to adopt to different block sizes as it might lead to
quite different descriptions. In hardware, the bit permutation is basically free to implement
as it consists simply of circuit wiring. Moreover, from the design strategy of GIFT, we see
that a bit permutation can be adjusted to various state sizes. Therefore, we choose bit
permutation over other choices of diffusion layer.
5.2 Structure of the DEFAULT PermBits
We recall here the structure of the PRESENT and GIFT bit permutations as this will be
useful later to understand our security guarantees. There are essentially two levels of
permutation within the PRESENT or GIFT bit permutation: the group mapping and the
SBox grouping.
Group Mapping. The mapping of the output bits from a group of 4 SBoxes to another
group of 4 SBoxes in the next round. This is the main difference between the PRESENT and
GIFT permutation. For 4-bit SBoxes, we denote the 4 bits as bit 0, 1, 2 and 3, where bit 0
is the least significant bit. Within a group, the PRESENT permutation sends the 4 output
bits from the ith SBox (index from 0) to bit i of the 4 SBoxes in the next round, forming a
symmetrical structure. Due to this symmetrical structure, PRESENT has many symmetrical
differential characteristics for a given fixed input and output differences, which results in a
higher differential probability (similar situation for the linear cryptanalysis case). On the
other hand, the GIFT permutation sends bit i from the output of the jth SBox (index from
0) to the bit i of the lth SBox in the next round, where l = i − j mod 4. Since bit i of
an SBox output is always mapped to bit i of another SBox, it makes the analysis on the
propagation of the differences easier and breaks the symmetry. Therefore, we choose GIFT
group mapping.
SBox Grouping. The partitioning of the SBoxes into the groups of 4 SBoxes. The SBox
grouping for the 64-bit block ciphers PRESENT and GIFT-64 are the same, and the designers
of GIFT extended the idea to construct SBox grouping for 128-bit block size. Similar to [11],
we denote the SBoxes in round i as Si0, S
i
1, . . . , S
i
g−1, where g = n/4 for block size n. These
SBoxes can be grouped in 2 different ways - the Quotient Q and Remainder R groups,
defined as Qx = {S4x, S4x+1, S4x+2, S4x+3} and Rx = {Sx, Sq+x, S2q+x, S3q+x}, where
q = g/4, 0 ≤ x ≤ q − 1. The SBox grouping simply maps SBoxes from Qxi to Rxi+1,
where within this group the 16-bit mapping is defined as the group mapping described
above. This is the adaptable component of the bit permutation, as one can see that the
SBox grouping is well-defined as long as n is a multiple of 16.
5.3 Selection of the DEFAULT SBoxes
Here we describe the selection process of the LS SBox (used in DEFAULT-LAYER) and the
non-LS SBox (used in DEFAULT-CORE) providing high resistance against linear attacks. A
summary of various properties of our chosen SBoxes together with SBoxes from other
lightweight ciphers (PRESENT, SKINNY-64 and GIFT) are shown in Table 3.
As for the size of the SBox, we decided to choose 4-bit. Although there are better
(in terms of DFA security) 8-bit SBoxes (see Table 1), we chose the 4-bit SBoxes for the
following main reasons: (1) to lower the cost (similar to GIFT [11]), (2) making the MILP
modelling (described in Section 7) more efficient as generating the same for 8-bit SBoxes
could be costly [43].
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Table 3: Properties of the DEFAULT (LS, Non-LS), PRESENT, SKINNY-64 and GIFT 4-bit SBoxes.
DBN is differential branch number, LBN is linear branch number, LS are the linear structures,
DU is the differential uniformity, AD is the algebraic degree of the coordinate functions and NL is
the non-linearity.




DEFAULT LS 037ED4A9CF18B265 3 3 0, 6, 9, f 16 2 1 0
DEFAULT Non-LS 196F7C82AED043B5 2 2 0 8 3 2 4
PRESENT [16] C56B90AD3EF84712 3 2 0 4 3 2 4
SKINNY-64 [13] C6901A2B385D4E7F 2 2 0 4 3 2 4
GIFT [11] 1A4C6F392DB7508E 2 2 0 6 3 2 4
LS SBox. From the list of 302 affine equivalence (AE) classes of SBoxes by De Cannière [20],
there are 10 AE classes with non-zero linear structures. Among these 10 AE classes, 8 of
them (#293 — #300) have only one non-zero linear structure, AE class #301 has three
non-zero linear structures and the last AE class #302 is fully linear (contains the identity
permutation). To maximize the number of linear structures and yet to use a non-linear
permutation, we chose the AE class #301 (the representative for this AE class in [20] is
1032456789ABCDEF).
Within this class, we chose an SBox with the following criteria (HW denoting Hamming
weight):
1. Both differential and linear branch number 3.
2. Zero diagonal in the DDT and LAT (except (0, 0)).
3. In the DDT, ∀δi ∈ F42 \ {0}, if (δi, δo) = 16, then HW (δi) ≥ 2, HW (δo) ≥ 2.
4. In the LAT, ∀αi ∈ F42 \ {0}, if (αi, αo) = 8, then HW (αi) +HW (αo) ≥ 4.
In other words, first we try to optimize the differential and linear diffusion with branch
number 3. Next, we avoid enabling 1-round iterative differential or linear patterns (hence
we look for empty diagonals). Then, for any probability 1 differential transition, we make
sure that the input and output difference Hamming weight is at least 2 (we could not find
an SBox for which such transitions necessarily happen with HW (δi) ≥ 3, or HW (δo) ≥ 3,
or HW (δi) +HW (δo) ≥ 5). Lastly, for any full linear transition, we select an SBox that
will maximize the Hamming weight of the input and output values. The two last criteria
are basically trying to maximize the number of active SBoxes before and after a probability
1 differential or a full linear transition. In total, we found 240 SBoxes candidates that
satisfy our selection criteria and we ended up choosing SBox 037ED4A9CF18B265.
Any of these 240 SBoxes, combined with our DEFAULT-LAYER bit permutation, ensures
the following properties: for any 5-round differential characteristic,
(P1) there are at least 10 active SBoxes,
(P2) if there are exactly 10 active SBoxes, then each of these active SBoxes has differential
probability 2−1 (which totals to 2−10),
(P3) if there exists one active SBox with differential probability 1, then there are at least
12 other active SBoxes with differential probability 2−1 each (which totals to 2−12).
We give a general intuition on how the selection criteria facilitates these properties (we
actually do not really need to prove these properties, since we will later be using automated
tools to guarantee bounds on the differential characteristics probability in Section 7). First,
observe that all the 240 SBoxes will ensure that ∀δ,∆ ∈ F42 \ {0},
(C1) if DDTS [δ,∆] > 0, then HW (δ) +HW (∆) ≥ 3,
(C2) if DDTS [δ,∆] = 16, then HW (δ) +HW (∆) ≥ 4,
(C3) if DDTS [δ,∆] = 16, then HW (δ) ≥ 2 and HW (∆) ≥ 2.
Then, from (C1) one can prove that there will be at least 10 active SBoxes over 5
rounds (P1) (in Figure 2(a)), which is basically Theorem 1 in [16]. By (C2) and the first
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case in the proof of Theorem 1 in [16], one can show that for such a 10-active SBoxes
differential characteristic, none of these SBoxes (in Figure 2(a)) can have a differential
probability 1 (P2). If there exists an SBox with differential probability 1, again by (C1)
and (C2), there are at least 13 active SBoxes (see Figure 2(b)). Criterion (C3) enforces
that only 1 of these 13 active SBoxes can potentially have differential probability 1 (P3).
(a) 10 active SBoxes with differen-
tial probability < 2−10
(b) 13 active SBoxes with differen-
tial probability < 2−12
Fig. 2: 5-round differential characteristics (solid lines are active bits, white boxes are active
SBoxes and red box is SBox with differential probability 1)
From these properties, we can (conservatively) estimate that the probability of any
differential characteristic drops by at least a factor of 22 for every additional round.
Non-LS SBox. For this SBox candidate, we focused on the linearity of the SBox as
linear attacks will be the most difficult part to protect. Among the 33 AE classes with the
lowest maximum linear bias 2−2, the AE classes #32 (represented by C0A23547691B8DEF)
and #33 (represented by D0A23547691BC8EF) have the least number of non-zero entries
in the LAT. Statistically speaking, this gives us a higher chance of finding linear branch
number 3 SBoxes. However, every 4× 4 SBox with linear branch number 3 has at least one
non-trivial linear structure (belonging to the AE classes #294, #297, #298, #300, #301,
#302 of [20]). Hence, we tried several of those SBoxes and obtained the corresponding
linear bias bounds using the automated technique described in Section 7. However, the
bounds we obtained were not good enough. Thus, our next strategy was to select an SBox
with the following linear properties:
1. ]{((αi, αo)) | HW (αi) = HW (αo) = 1, (αi, αo) 6= 0} = 1.
2. Zero diagonal in the LAT (except (0, 0)).
3. ]{((αi, αo)) | HW (αi) +HW (αo) = 3, (αi, αo) = ±4} = 13.
4. ]{((αi, αo)) | HW (αi) +HW (αo) = 3, (αi, αo) = ±2} = 6.
In other words, first we limit the number of Hamming weight 1→ 1 transitions to 110.
Next, we avoid having a 1-round iterative linear pattern. Lastly, we minimize the number
of possible Hamming weight 1→ 2 and 2→ 1 transitions. This is to encourage faster and
wider propagation of the linear trail. We finally choose the SBox 196F7C82AED043B5 from
the AE class #32.
We note that other considerations could be incorporated in addition to the ones
mentioned in this section, such as side-channel attacks resilient criteria [29], but we believe
this falls out of the scope of our research that tries to focus on natural immunity to DFA.
5.4 Unbiased Linear Structures
We need an extra security criterion: each bit of the linear structures of S as well as S−1
must be unbiased. This is to avoid certain undesirable property of the linear layer. If we
assume that the linear structures for S are {0, 1, 2, 3}, the two MSBs are always 0. One
10In [38], the authors show that, under their BOGI+ paradigm, when there are at least 9
consecutive rounds, having only 1 Hamming weight 1→ 1 transition is a sufficient condition to
achieve a theoretic bound of at least 2 active SBoxes per round.
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such SBox is 1032456789ABCDEF (the representative for class #301 in [20]). It has the
property that if the first two bits of its input are known uniquely, then the first two bits of
its output are also known uniquely. The attacker may be able to leverage this property
by attacking the penultimate round of the cipher/protection layer, with attacking the
last round. This issue does not arise when each bit of the linear structures is unbiased
(in which case the attacker is not able to find any bit uniquely). In our chosen LS SBox,
the linear structures being {0, 6, 9, f}, and that of the inverse SBox being {0, 5, a, f}, this
criterion is indeed satisfied.
6 Security Analysis
Conducting security analysis on DEFAULT is quite different from conducting security analysis
on block ciphers, despite having similar structure. This is because DEFAULT-LAYER is built
on top of an existing (and presumably secure against classical attacks) cipher and only
assists in providing the desired security against DFA, while DEFAULT-CORE is used in
conjunction with two instances of DEFAULT-LAYER. Although classical attacks do not pose
any threat against DEFAULT-LAYER, some cryptanalytic techniques could still be applied
to DEFAULT through DFA. For instance, suppose an attacker injects faults to the output
of the main cipher, this difference will only propagate through the DEFAULT-LAYER and
not the entire cipher, creating some form of differential attack on the DEFAULT-LAYER
itself. Thus, we need to ensure that DEFAULT-LAYER is not vulnerable to classical attacks
that could bypass the main cipher using DFA and target DEFAULT-LAYER directly. The
desired security for the classical attacks are summarized in Table 4 and security evaluation
against such attacks are done subsequently in Section 6.2. Detailed discussion on the
classical attacks are omitted here for brevity, but interested readers may find it for example
in [11, Section 4]. It may be noted that more precise differential and linear bounds are
presented in Section 7. The security against DFA and side-channel attacks are evaluated
subsequently (Section 6.1 and Section 6.3, respectively).
Table 4: Security requirement of DEFAULT against classical attacks
DEFAULT-LAYER DEFAULT-CORE
Differential, Algebraic 264 Search Complexity –
Integral, Impossible Diff. – No Distinguisher
Linear 232 Search Complexity 264 Search Complexity
Invariant Subspace – 2128 Search Complexity
As DEFAULT comprises of DEFAULT-CORE and (two layers of) DEFAULT-LAYER, we specify
which component we are analyzing and for which cryptanalysis technique. The analysis is
summarized in Table 5.
6.1 Differential Fault Attacks
First, we look at DFA on DEFAULT-LAYER, when it is used as a protection layer for
other block ciphers. Next, we look at DFA on DEFAULT-CORE or other block ciphers with
DEFAULT-LAYER as protection layer.
DFA on DEFAULT-LAYER. Our chosen SBox has 3 non-trivial linear structures: 6, 9, f.
Hence, for any input α ∈ {0, . . . , f}, the attacker cannot uniquely identify which among
{α, α ⊕ 6, α ⊕ 9, α ⊕ f} is the actual input to the SBox. In other words, the attacker
will be able to identify one partition of the input: {{0, 6, 9, f}, {1, 7, 8, e}, {2, 4, b, d},
{3, 5, a, c}}, but will not be able to identify which particular input is correct. Similarly for
the output of the SBox, due to the linear structures, the attacker will only able to identify
the partition to be one of these {{0, 5, a, f}, {1, 4, b, e}, {2, 7, 8, d}, {3, 6, 9, c}} and not a
particular output.
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Differential Fault Attacks (64-bit Security)
On DEFAULT-LAYER 264 Bypassed 264
Sec. 6.1On DEFAULT-CORE ≥ 264 Negligible > 264
Double Fault Not applicable
Classical Cryptanalysis (128-bit Security)
Differential ≥ 264 > 224 (Trivial) > 2128
Sec. 6.2
Linear > 240 > 2128 > 2128
Impossible Diff. Main cipher Not vulnerable Not vulnerable
Invariant Subspace Main cipher Not vulnerable Not vulnerable
Algebraic Main cipher Not vulnerable Not vulnerable
In the last round attack of DEFAULT-LAYER, the attacker has to inject faults and analyze
each of the 32 SBoxes independently. That means, for each SBox he has to do a brute-force
search of 4, leading to a total search complexity of 432 = 264.
DFA on DEFAULT-CORE or other block ciphers with DEFAULT-LAYER. Alternatively,
the adversary could still try to launch DFA on the main cipher by injecting fault(s) to the
last round of it and hope that it will propagate nicely through DEFAULT-LAYER. If so, it
boils down to whether the adversary can distinguish the output difference from the main
cipher with less than 264 effort, otherwise it is better off attacking DEFAULT-LAYER directly
(264). Using MILP, we found that the maximum differential probability of DEFAULT-LAYER
is upper bounded by 2−64 (details in Section 7.2). Thus, the attack complexity is too high
and this alternative strategy is not worthwhile.
Information-combining DFA on DEFAULT-LAYER. An attacker could apply DFA on
multiple rounds and hope to combine these learnt information to further reduce the number
of key candidates. For instance, targeting the last two rounds of DEFAULT, or the first and
last round of DEFAULT through DFA on both the encryption and decryption processes.
Such a possibility was first identified for a previous version of DEFAULT by a reviewer
from CRYPTO 2021 and ASIACRYPT 2021 and later confirmed independently by a team
of researchers [33]. In order to avoid this attack vector, we have designed a special key
schedule for DEFAULT.
First, assume an idealized DEFAULT-LAYER variant where all round keys are independent,
which can basically be seen as defining a new component DEFAULT-LAYER with a much
larger key input size (128-bit of key material per round). In this variant, since a fresh new
round key is added at every round, the information-combining attack becomes useless for
the attacker.
The goal of the key schedule in DEFAULT is therefore to mimic the behaviour of this
idealized variant for a reasonable performance cost. Namely, we use 4 entire DEFAULT
rounds to generate the next round key, which is chosen to ensure full diffusion. Then, we
limit the number of distinct round keys to 4 (for performance), since our analysis shows
that combining information throughout 4 rounds is very difficult.
We note that more conservative options could be selected for the key schedule, with an
obvious performance cost during the round key precomputation: for example one could
have 8 distinct rounds keys (instead of 4) and/or use more entire DEFAULT rounds to
generate the next round key.
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6.2 Classical Cryptanalysis
In the following, we apply classical cryptanalysis techniques on DEFAULT. Recall that
DEFAULT has a sandwich structure with two DEFAULT-LAYER layers and a DEFAULT-CORE
layer in the middle. For most of the cryptanalysis considered, it will be sufficient to show
that DEFAULT-CORE is resistant against the attack.
Differential Cryptanalysis. Using MILP, we found that the maximum differential
probability of DEFAULT-LAYER is upper bounded by 2−64 (details in Section 7.2). Since there
are two layers of DEFAULT-LAYER, we already show that there is no meaningful differential
characteristic tracing across two layers of DEFAULT with differential probability more than
2−128. In addition, DEFAULT-CORE has 24 rounds and any differential characteristic will
involve at least 1 active SBox per round. Thus, this trivially adds an additional factor of
2−24 to any differential characteristic. In summary, DEFAULT is not susceptible to differential
cryptanalysis.
Linear Cryptanalysis. Using MILP, we found that the absolute linear bias of 11-
round DEFAULT-CORE is upper bounded by 2−33 (details in Section 7.2). Thus, with a
simple concatenation of two 11-round linear characteristics, we can show that there is
no meaningful 22-round linear characteristic in DEFAULT-CORE. In addition, there are two
layers of DEFAULT-LAYER, which will only make the linear cryptanalysis even harder to
realise (even though linear structures are present in the SBox). In summary, DEFAULT is
not susceptible to linear cryptanalysis.
Impossible Differential Attacks. We considered the possible effect of impossible dif-
ferential attacks against DEFAULT-CORE. As proposed in [39], we generated MILP instances










= 16384 differentials with both the input and output
differences of Hamming weight 1 on DEFAULT-CORE and check if any of these instances were
infeasible, which implies impossible differential. For the 7th round, we observe all instances
are feasible (i.e., no impossible differential exists). Therefore, following the philosophy
of [39], we believe the full-round DEFAULT-CORE is secure against impossible differential
attacks.
Invariant Subspace Attacks. In order to simplify the analysis of invariant subspace
attacks, we assume that any (affine) subspaces are preserved over the entire DEFAULT-LAYER,
the PermBits and AddRoundConstants step. Thus, we focus on subspace transition over
the SubCells step in DEFAULT-CORE, namely the non-LS SBoxes layer.
There is no dimension 3 (affine) subspace transition, and among the dimension 2 transi-
tions most of them can only propagate up to 3 rounds, except one: 5⊕ {0, 2, c, e} → 0⊕ {0, 2, c, e}.
Notice that this affine subspace will be preserved over the AddRoundKey step if each nibble
of the round key belongs to {5, 7, 9, b}.
Suppose each nibble of Ki belongs to {5, 7, 9, b}. During the key schedule update (again
we assume that the subspace is preserved over PermBits and AddRoundConstants), we
have (R′)4({5, 7, 9, b}) → {7, 4, d, 8}. Ki+1 will break the subspace structure unless all
nibbles of Ki are 5, resulting in all nibbles of Ki+1 to be 7. However in the next update,
all nibbles of Ki+2 will be 4 6∈ {5, 7, 9, b}. Thus, we believe that no (affine) subspace can
be preserved for more than 3 rounds and DEFAULT is not vulnerable to invariant subspace
attacks.
Algebraic Attacks. In order to evaluate the security of DEFAULT-CORE against alge-
braic attacks, we checked its algebraic properties using Sage11. We are able to represent
DEFAULT-CORE as Boolean expressions up to 4-rounds. We have observed that the minimum
number of monomials is 11101, at least 97 variables (out of 128) are involved and the
minimum algebraic degree is 8. Furthermore, computing bounds on the maximum algebraic
11http://www.sagemath.org/
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degree for different number of rounds according to the degree estimate given in [17], we
can hope to reach maximum degree 127 after 8 rounds.
Integral Attacks. Suppose an attacker repeats the encryption multiple times and injects
all possible differential fault values to a specific word in the output of the main cipher.
This is similar to collecting a set of inputs (more precisely the output from the main
cipher) with specific structure to launch an integral attack. Such model is reported in [36]
and [37, Chapter 6.3].
This model is a special case of DFA where all possible faults are considered. Since the
attacker does not get any extra information by using all possible faults, DEFAULT-LAYER
(and hence DEFAULT) is resistant against it.
As for DEFAULT-CORE, we could reuse some of the security analysis of GIFT-128 for our
design. In particular, the designers of GIFT evaluated the longest integral distinguisher
for GIFT-128 using the (bit-based) division property [44] to be 11 rounds, and concluded
that GIFT-128 is secure against integral attacks. Since DEFAULT-CORE has 28 rounds, we
believe that DEFAULT-CORE is secure against integral attacks.
Using the SOLVATORE tool [24], we could find a distinguisher for DEFAULT-LAYER till
12 rounds. Beyond this, no solution is returned in a reasonable time.
6.3 Protection Against Side-Channel Attacks
In essence, DEFAULT-LAYER/DEFAULT is simply a bit permutation based SPN block cipher
and, as such, usual side-channels attacks might apply on it. Usual countermeasures such
as masking can of course be applied on DEFAULT.
We point out that protecting DEFAULT against side-channels attacks should not make
DFA easier. An additional feature of the DEFAULT-LAYER SBox is that it has lower number
of AND operations compared to the usual SBoxes used in other cipher designs, hence
making it easier to mask [31]. One might argue that the large number of rounds of DEFAULT
or DEFAULT-LAYER would be problematic, but implementation trade-offs would partially
avoid this issue (implementing 2 or 4 rounds per clock cycle would greatly improve the
throughput while moderately increase the area).
6.4 Comparison With CRAFT, FRIET and Duplicated Computation
As stated earlier, CRAFT, FRIET and duplication are the most relevant countermeasures
when comparing with DEFAULT. Under a single fault adversary, duplication and DEFAULT
are all secure against DFA. CRAFT in itself does not protect against DFA but is designed
with a consideration to make it cost effective when integrating error detection codes. CRAFT
only protects against faults that are detectable by the deployed error detection code and
remains vulnerable to faults outside the detection capability. For an error detection codes
with minimum distance d (i.e. minimum distance between distinct codewords), CRAFT can
detect faults altering up to t(= d− 1) cells12 at once (within one cycle). Note that for low
cost equipment where injected faults are often random, the probability of getting a fault
which is beyond the detection limit of error detection code is non-negligible. With precise
fault injection equipment, an adversary could inject specific difference large enough (≥ t
cells) to change the code to another valid code and fool the error detection mechanism
trivially. On the contrary, DEFAULT is not bounded by any such t.
FRIET adopts a parity check code to detect a single-limb13 fault in the computation.
Similar to CRAFT, for faults that alter more than one limb are beyond the detection limit.
Again, DEFAULT is not bounded by any such limb.
Regarding duplicate faults, CRAFT claims no security. Duplicated computation was
demonstrated to be broken by injecting two identical faults in the redundant execution
12The “cell” is adopted from the CRAFT paper [14] referring to the word size.
13The “limb” refers to an array of bits within the internal state of FRIET
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using state of the art fault injection equipment [40]. DEFAULT is not vulnerable to DFA
under duplicate faults as it does not rely on redundancy.
6.5 Other Fault Attacks
Although we do not claim security against attacks that uses analysis method 2, for
completeness we discuss the security of our design against some of such attacks.
Fault Altering Control/Algorithm Flow. Since our solution is at algorithm level and
does not rely on any engineering solutions, it is natural that our security claim holds under
the assumption of the correctness of our algorithm. Therefore, we do not claim security
against faults that alter the execution sequence of the algorithm. An accomplished attacker
could hypothetically skip the execution of DEFAULT-LAYER completely with a control flow
fault and can target the main cipher with standard DFA.
Hypothetical Multiple Precision Fault Attacks. Consider a multiple precision fault
attack where the adversary injects a fault to introduce a specific difference just before an
SBox and another difference right after the same SBox in an attempt to precisely cancel
the difference. When the cancellation is successful, it will result in the same output as a
fault-free execution, and the adversary can obtain the possible solutions for that SBox.
While this is not effective against our LS SBoxes, it could still target the main cipher
which typically does not have any LS. Feasibility of such precise multiple faults have never
been demonstrated. In addition, this attack falls under analysis method 2 which is outside
of our fault model.
Precise Bit Flipping Attacks. A single bit flip on a specific bit, though much harder
to achieve, has been reported in practice by lasers [4]. Despite its precision, bit precision
DFA (equivalent to injecting a Hamming weight 1 difference) will still be ineffective against
our design. As described in Section 6.1, any input α will still lead to multiple solutions
thanks to our LS SBox.
Assume that the adversary can target the logic gate component of the SBox, there
could be a statistical attack, but again, we do not make claims against attacks that fall
under analysis method 2.
Other non-DFA models. The Safe Error Attack (SEA) [27, 45, 46] model has been
proposed which utilizes the cases where the faulty and non-faulty outputs are the same.
Among the SEA models, one particular model is known as Ineffective Fault Attack (IFA) [19].
Another type of fault attack uses statistical information on the output distribution as it has
become biased because of fault injection [34,47]. Such analysis often are based upon hostile
fault models like stuck-at, permanent or persistent faults which assume a stronger attacker,
specially stuck-at faults which are widely used in the fault analysis literature [22, 34].
Stuck-at faults in electronic devices are generally related to defects in devices either at
manufacturing or due to high-energy radiation in space electronics. Injecting stuck-at fault
intentionally for malicious purpose requires expensive equipment like precise lasers, ion
beams, etc. and thus considered under strong adversary capability . In comparison, bit flips
or random faults are relatively easier to realise with simple fault injection equipment. A
hybrid model – Statistical Ineffective Fault Attack (SIFA) [22] is proposed. It relies on both
ineffective fault and statistical information of the computation. All these attacks exploit
information leakages from statistical biases under analysis method 2, which is beyond our
focus. If needed, specialized countermeasures can be used [6, 9].
7 Automated Bounds for Differential and Linear Attacks
In [32], the authors present a method to find optimal differential and linear characteristics
based on Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP), which is then tuned to work with
bit permutation based block ciphers in [43].
Indeed, our special SBox with linear structures has probability 1 differential transitions
(resp., ±1/2 linear bias). For the differential case, the above mentioned approach will
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always yield an MEDP bound of εd = 1 (1 is raised to the power of an integer), which
naturally signifies the smallest possible protection against differential attacks (the attack
succeeds with only one chosen input difference or two chosen inputs). In case of linear
cryptanalysis, it can be shown that the overall bias εl, considering only ±1/2 biases (and
assuming mutual independence of the biases), is 1/2. This is obtained by substituting
εi = 1/2 ∀i in [42, Lemma 3.1]. Similar to the differential case, this also leads to the
smallest protection against linear attack (the attack succeeds with roughly 1/ε2l = 4 known
inputs). Naturally, we need to devise a way to count precisely the number of probability
1/2 differential transitions and ±1/4 linear biases.
To overcome this problem, we devise a new strategy which is inspired from the concept
of indicator constraint used in linear programming (also known as the big M method),
where a large constant M is chosen.
The details of our strategy and description of the MILP modeling can be found in
Appendix D.
7.1 Optimizations
Using the idea described in previous section, we construct the MILP problems and attempt
to solve them using the Gurobi14 solver. Being inspired from [30], we use redundancy in
the MILP constraints. Using redundant constraints together with the usual constraints
does not change the problem description, but could make the execution faster. As for the
choice of the heuristics, we use the idea of Convex Hull (CH) [43].
For the differential case, we use the complete set of the CH inequalities, while for the
linear case we use the greedy algorithm to select a subset of the complete set of the CH
inequalities. The details on generation of the CH inequalities and the greedy algorithm can
be found in [43]. We observe that using the heuristics the solution time can be improved
by almost a factor of 10 compared to the respective cases where no heuristic was used. For
more details on the heuristics, refer to [5].
7.2 Results
For the LS SBox (used in DEFAULT-LAYER), the bounds obtained from the corresponding
MILP programs are: 2−4 at the 5th round for linear, and 2−20 at the 7th round for
differential. This translates to around 28 computations for 5 rounds against classical linear
attacks and around 220 computations against differential attacks. Hence, we believe 28
rounds of DEFAULT-LAYER is enough to provide a security level of 264 computations against
classical differential attacks and of 232 computations against classical linear attacks.
As explained in Section 6.2, we only consider the security against the classical linear at-
tack against DEFAULT-CORE. For the non-LS SBox (used in DEFAULT-CORE) 196F7C82AED043B5,
the bound obtained from the MILP program for the linear case is 33.00 at the 11th round.
Hence, the linear cryptanalysis security at 11 rounds of DEFAULT-CORE is around 266
computations. Hence, we conclude DEFAULT ensures the required DFA security (of 264
computations) and also the required classical security (of 2128 computations).
Table 6: Differential and linear bounds (in − log2 notation) for LS and non-LS SBoxes
(a) LS SBox: 037ED4A9CF18B265
Rounds 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Diff. 0 0 2 6 10 15 20
Linear 0 0 0 1 4 - -
(b) Non-LS SBox: 196F7C82AED043B5
Rounds 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Linear 1 2 4 6 8 12 16 20 25 30 33
More results regarding this can be found in Table 6 (Table 6(a) for differential and
linear bounds for the LS SBox 037ED4A9CF18B265 and Table 6(b) for linear bounds for the
non-LS SBox 196F7C82AED043B5), as obtained from the MILP instances. Those results are
14https://www.gurobi.com/
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obtained from a workstation with 16× Intel Xeon E7-8880 physical cores (shared among
multiple users), running Gurobi 8.1 on 64-bit Ubuntu 18.04. Due to the time taken by the
solver, it would be difficult to compute the bounds beyond the ones given in Table 6, at
least with the current modelling (and with our computing resource).
8 Performance
In this part we state benchmarks for hardware and software implementations of DEFAULT.
Comparison is done with GIFT-128 and a duplication-protected GIFT-128 which runs the
same computation twice (in space or time) and compares the output. The output is released
only if both computations produce same ciphertext, otherwise it is suppressed. This is
the so-called detective countermeasure [10]. As a side note, it can be mentioned that the
current academic researches have drifted away from the simple detective countermeasure
towards more sophisticated error detection code-based or infection-based countermeasures,
which would incur higher overheads. If such a sophisticated countermeasure is taken into
account, DEFAULT provides much better performance.
8.1 Hardware Benchmark
The area and throughput for DEFAULT, GIFT-128 and AES are given in Table 7. We
also provide the same for GIFT-128 and AES when protected with spatial or temporal
duplication, or with DEFAULT-LAYER. The code is written in Verilog, and synthesized
on Synopsys Design Compiler J-2019 on the TSMC 65nm standard cell library using
compile ultra. The area is given in gate equivalents. The throughput is computed for 2
GHz clock frequency. We assume the round keys are precomputed for all implementations.
The implementations of DEFAULT and the protected ciphers are available online15 and
depicted in Figures 4 and 5. For GIFT-128 with DEFAULT-LAYER, we implemented two
versions. The first (v1) is a simple combination of DEFAULT-LAYER with main cipher, while
the second one (v2) takes advantage of the structural similarities between GIFT-128 and
DEFAULT-LAYER. For AES, we noticed that the area required to implement DEFAULT-LAYER
is small compared to the size of the AES circuit. Besides, the AES circuit is the bottleneck for
clock frequency. Hence, we experimented with 3 different architectures for DEFAULT-LAYER
i.e. one round (×1), two round (×2) and four rounds (×4) unrolled per clock cycle (see
Appendix E). In order to put our results into perspective, we implemented two versions of
the simple duplication countermeasure for AES and GIFT-128. The first version is temporal
duplication, where the cipher is implemented once and called twice, then the outputs are
compared. The second version is spatial duplication, where two instances of cipher are
computed in parallel followed by final comparison.






DEFAULT-LAYER 1786 28 9143
DEFAULT 2377 80 3200
GIFT-128 + DEFAULT-LAYER (v1/v2) 2410 96 2667
GIFT-128 1584 40 6400
GIFT-128 temporal duplication 2608 81 3160
GIFT-128 spatial duplication 3680 41 6244
AES + DEFAULT-LAYER (×1) 15692 67 3821
AES + DEFAULT-LAYER (×2) 16861 39 6564
AES + DEFAULT-LAYER (×4) 18889 25 10240
AES 14451 11 23273
AES temporal duplication 15475 23 11130
AES spatial duplication 29414 12 21333
15https://github.com/mustafa-khairallah/default
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Our results show that for GIFT-128, the area needed to add the DEFAULT-LAYER is
small, where the area needed for the full design is similar to that of DEFAULT, while the
throughput drops by a factor of 2.4×. The area of our design is significantly smaller than
both types of duplication. This takes advantage of the similarities between GIFT-128 and
DEFAULT, where they share the linear layer and storage, while differing in only the sbox.
For AES, the cost for adding DEFAULT-LAYER (×1) to AES is also small, while the
DEFAULT-LAYER (×4) architecture leads to the highest throughput. Unlike GIFT-128, the
differences between AES and DEFAULT-LAYER lead to a smaller advantage over duplication.
Temporal duplication behaves better than AES +DEFAULT-LAYER, while spatial duplication
have much higher throughput but at the cost 55% larger area. While the AES duplication
countermeasure is competitive in terms of performance, the drawbacks of simple dupli-
cations were discussed in details in Section 6.4, which we believe justifies the cost of our
countermeasure.
We have also synthesized our implementations for the Xilinx Kintex 7 FPGA. We
fixed the clock frequency to 200 MHz. Due to the nature of FPGA look-up tables (LUTs),
they are sometimes under-utilized. This makes it possible to add extra functionality or
extra flip-flops to the design for almost no cost. The results are given in Table 8. Our
results show that the DEFAULT-LAYER can be added to GIFT-128 for no extra LUTs or
flip-flops. The throughput drops by a factor of 2.4×. Both types of duplication lead to
drop in throughput and increase in both LUTs and flip-flops.
Table 8: FPGA Synthesis Results on Kintex 7.
Design Cycles LUT FF
Throughput
(Mbps)
DEFAULT-LAYER 28 256 128 914.3
DEFAULT 80 256 128 320.0
GIFT-128 + DEFAULT-LAYER v1 96 358 128 266.7
GIFT-128 + DEFAULT-LAYER v2 96 256 128 266.7
GIFT-128 40 256 128 640.0
GIFT-128 temporal duplication 81 384 256 316.0
GIFT-128 spatial duplication 41 640 256 624.4
AES + DEFAULT-LAYER (×1) 67 918 128 382.1
AES + DEFAULT-LAYER (×2) 39 964 128 656.4
AES + DEFAULT-LAYER (×4) 25 1204 128 1024.0
AES 11 528 128 2327.3
AES temporal duplication 23 656 256 1113.0
AES spatial duplication 12 1184 256 2133.3
In the case of duplication for AES, the ×1, ×2 and ×4 unrolled architectures of
DEFAULT-LAYER have larger overhead compared to duplication. While duplication is about
twice as efficient as our solution when it comes to AES, this is only specific to AES as
its base line cost is relatively reduced on FPGAs, taking advantage of the large LUTs
available. Moreover, the security features of DEFAULT compared to duplication still makes
it interesting for AES on FPGAs.
8.2 Software Benchmark
The software benchmarks for GIFT-128, duplicated GIFT-128 (in time) and DEFAULT
are given in Table 9. The relative overheads compared to GIFT-128 are shown within
parenthesis. The clock cycles were measured by utilizing time() function from time.h
library in C, by averaging over multiple executions. Program was running on a single core.
Compiler optimizations were disabled to produce a consistent result. Note that the main
purpose of this benchmark is to show the relative performance compared to GIFT in the
same setting. It can be seen that the code size for DEFAULT is slightly more compared
to duplicated GIFT-128, but at the same time DEFAULT is faster. We would also like to
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note that a new efficient software representation of GIFT was published recently [2], called
the fixslicing technique, drastically reducing the cycles needed for encryption on ARM
Cortex-M family of microcontrollers. The fixsliced implementation of DEFAULT would have
very similar per-round performances as GIFT-128, as the permutation is the same (which
is what the fixslicing technique is trying to optimize), while the Sboxes have similar cost.
Overall, we expect the overheads to be similar as it scales accordingly to the number of
rounds. Generally, this scaling would apply to other optimizations as well.
Table 9: Software benchmarking for DEFAULT and GIFT-128 with/without duplication
Intel Xeon Silver 4215 Arm Cortex A-53
Speed
(Cycles/Bytes)
GIFT-128 9.7 (1.000×) 61.3 (1.000×)
GIFT-128 Duplicated 21.9 (2.258×) 124.4 (2.029×)
DEFAULT 19.2 (1.979×) 121.9 (1.989×)
Code Size
(Bytes)
GIFT-128 6624 (1.000×) 5593 (1.000×)
GIFT-128 Duplicated 6859 (1.035×) 5818 (1.040×)
DEFAULT 8024 (1.211×) 7085 (1.267×)
9 Conclusion and Future Works
In this paper, we presented the first theoretical study on SBoxes with respect to their
properties against differential fault attacks. We observe that DFA works as a simplified
model of differential attacks, yet the properties of an SBox which makes DFA harder, will
make DA easier, and vice-versa. Our findings enabled us to propose the first cipher-level
countermeasure against DFA. Our construction does not incur too much overhead and is
competitive with state-of-the-art in terms of performances, while protecting against a larger
spectrum of faults. The core idea is to use a special SBox with linear structures, so that
when trying all possible fault values, the attacker is not able to narrow down the search
space below square root bound. This work opens up a new paradigm of symmetric-key
cipher design, by studying SBoxes with LS, which has not been explored much yet.
Below we summarize the advantages and limitations of our proposal.
+ First cipher-level protection. This solves the concern raised against existing DFA
countermeasures (Section 2.2). In particular, we remove the DFA protection from the
hand of the cipher implementer to the cipher designer.
+ Scalable to (almost) all symmetric-key primitives as an ad-hoc layer. Using
DEFAULT-LAYER, the basic concept we propose can be scaled to ensure a non-trivial
DFA security on any symmetric-key primitive. We give a proof of concept for 128-bit
state size, but it can be easily adapted to handle any state size that is multiple of 16
bits (by adjusting the number of rounds).
+ Possibility to get a non-trivial DFA security. The particular instantiation we
propose offers up to 2n/2 DFA security where n ≥ 128 is the state size of a block cipher
(without jeopardizing its classical security). However, this is not a maximum limit
as can be seen from Table 1. Note that, attack complexity of 2n/2 can be considered
impractical for fault attacks.
+ Protected against duplicate faults. DEFAULT is not vulnerable to duplicate faults,
unlike duplication based countermeasure. This remains true regardless of the number
of faults, unlike some error detection based protection where faults are not detected
beyond a certain coverage.
+ Extension to any FA that uses differential analysis method. The use of LS
Sboxes increases the number of solutions for any given differential, which makes any
attack under analysis method 1 harder.
+ No need for external randomness/ protected device. The commonly referred
infective countermeasure [10] uses an external source of randomness. For the protocol
level countermeasures, such as [8], a part of the device is assumed to be off limit to
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the attacker due some device level protection. In our case, there is neither a need for
an external source of entropy nor a specially protected device.
− Not full DFA security. It is technically possible to achieve almost full DFA security
(such as 2112 for a 128-bit state, see Table 1). However, it does not seem possible to
achieve a full state-size DFA security by this methodology.
We believe our work opens up a new research direction for ciphers that are resilient
against fault attacks, here are a few potential open problems that would be interesting
to explore in the future. One can look for a self-inverse SBox that fits our criteria to
reduce the hardware cost when both the layer and its inverse are implemented in the same
circuit. As the LS SBox has fewer AND operations, future ciphers could be designed while
leveraging this. Finally, a solution that would combine fault protection with side-channel
resistance would be extremely valuable. On the attack side, it would be interesting to
study how far one could go with a combined side-channel analysis/DFA against DEFAULT.
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A Results
Proof of Lemma 1. Since both α and α⊕ a are solutions of S(x)⊕ S(x⊕ δ) = ∆(α, δ), for
any δ, so we have S(α)⊕S(α⊕ δ) = ∆(α, δ) = S(α⊕a)⊕S(α⊕a⊕ δ). From this, we have,
S(α)⊕S(α⊕ δ) = S(α⊕a)⊕S(α⊕a⊕ δ) =⇒ S(α⊕ δ)⊕S(α⊕ δ⊕a) = S(α)⊕S(α⊕a).
As the above relation holds for any δ so we can write S(x)⊕ S(x⊕ a) = S(α)⊕ S(α⊕ a)
holds for all x. This means that a is a linear structure of S. ut
Proof of Lemma 2. We show that (a1, a2) is a linear structure of (S1, S2) if and only if a1, a2
are linear structures of S1 and S2 respectively. If (a1, a2) is a linear structure of (S1, S2),
then for some constant (c1, c2) ∈ Fn2 × Fn2 , (S1(x), S2(y)) ⊕ (S1(x ⊕ a1), S2(y ⊕ a2)) =
(c1, c2), for all x, y ∈ Fn2 . Therefore, (S1(x), S2(0)) ⊕ (S1(x ⊕ a1), S2(a2)) = (c1, c2) for
all x ∈ Fn2 , from which we have (S1(x) ⊕ S1(x ⊕ a1), S2(0)) ⊕ S2(a2)) = (c1, c2), that is
S1(x)⊕ S1(x⊕ a1) = c1 for all x ∈ Fn2 . Therefore, a1 is a linear structure of S1. Similarly,
it can be proved that a2 is a linear structure of S2. Conversely if a1, a2 are linear structures
of S1 and S2 respectively, then it is easy to prove that (a1, a2) of (S1, S2). Thus the
total number of linear structures of (S1, S2) is `1`2 (including the trivial linear structure
(0, 0)). ut
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose a ∈ Fn2 is a linear structure of L ◦F . Then we have L(F (x))⊕
L(F (x ⊕ a)) = c, for some constant c ∈ Fn2 . This implies that L((F (x) ⊕ F (x ⊕ a)) = c,
that is F (x)⊕ F (x⊕ a) = L−1(c). Therefore, a is also a linear structure of F .
To prove the converse; that is if a is a linear structure of F , then a is also a linear
structure of L ◦ F . Therefore, a is a linear structure of L ◦ F if and only if a is a linear
structure of F . ut
Definition 7 (Expanded DDT). Expanded DDT of the SBox S is a matrix having the
same dimension as its DDT, where entry corresponding to the input difference δ and output
difference ∆ is the set of solutions for the equation S(x)⊕ S(x⊕ δ) = ∆.
Hence, Expanded DDT gives the actual solutions, whereas DDT only shows the cardinality
of each solutions instead.
Theorem 3. If an n×n SBox has l non-zero linear structures, then the minimum non-zero
value in its DDT = min (2n, 2l + 2).
Proof. Let the l non-zero linear structures are a1, . . . , al. Hence, for δ ∈ {a1, . . . , al},
the minimum non-zero value in the corresponding rows are 2n (in fact, this is the only
non-zero value in its DDT if the SBox is linear). For δ /∈ {a1, . . . , al}, the elements
α, α⊕ δ, α⊕ α1, α⊕ α1 ⊕ δ, . . . , α⊕ αl, α⊕ αl ⊕ δ ∈ Sα〈δ〉. Hence the result follows. ut
Theorem 3 indicates that if we want better protection against DFA (by increasing
linear structures in the SBox), then at the same time the minimum entry in its DDT will
also grow, making it harder to resist against differential attack.
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Remark 4. By choosing an SBox for which large number of coordinate functions are affine,
it is possible to get more LS. For an n× n SBox S, if it has c (≤ n− 2) affine coordinate
functions, then it can have 2c linear structures. For example, the 8 × 8 SBox given
by the coordinate functions, S(x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7) = (x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x0x1 ⊕
x6, x0x1 ⊕ x7) has 26 = 64 LS. As a side note, it can be mentioned that the SBox
S(x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7) = (x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x0x1 ⊕ x7) has 64 LS too.
Remark 5. Although (in terms of maximum DFA security) the maximum number of LS
an n× n SBox can have is 2n−1 (as 2n LS would make the SBox linear), so far we are able
to find SBoxes with at most 2n−2 LS (see Remark 4). Whether or not such SBox exists
is thus an open problem. This problem can be considered orthogonal to the Big APN
Problem [18].
Remark 6. Having a non-zero linear structure does not imply zero non-linearity. For
example, the SBox 0123458967CDEFBA has a linear structure at 1 but has non-linearity of
2.
Theorem 4. If S(x) ⊕ S(x ⊕ δ) = ∆(α, δ) has only two solutions, then there exists
a δ′, such that α is the unique common solution for S(x) ⊕ S(x ⊕ δ) = ∆(α, δ) and
S(x)⊕ S(x⊕ δ′) = ∆(α, δ′).
Proof. Consider S(x)⊕S(x⊕δ) = ∆(α, δ) which has only two solutions, α and α⊕δ. On the
contrary assume that for all input differences d, if α is a solution of S(x)⊕S(x⊕d) = ∆(α, d),
so is α ⊕ δ. Then by Lemma 1, we have that δ is a linear structure of S, which is a
contradiction. Thus there will be a δ′ such that α is a solution of S(x)⊕S(x⊕δ′) = ∆(α, δ′),
but α⊕ δ is not. ut
Note that Theorem 4 is a generalization of [28, Proposition 1]. In the proof [28, Appendix
A.1], we see that the common solution depends on the span of two faults. So, for the
applicability of [28, Proposition 1], those two faults must exist. In contrast, our proof
shows that, if there is any fault δ that has 2 solutions, there will be another fault such
that the solution is unique. Also, we propose an extension to it in Theorem 5.
Remark 7. For simplicity, denote ∆(α, δ) by ∆ and ∆(α, δ′) by ∆′. If |Sα〈δ〉| = 2, S(α) 6= 0
and S(α⊕ δ) 6= 0, then δ′ can be chosen as δ′ = α⊕ S−1(∆), such that Sα〈δ〉 ∩ Sα〈δ′〉 =
α. Notice that, in this case, ∆′ = S(α)⊕ S(α⊕ δ′) = S(α)⊕∆ = S(α⊕ δ).
Definition 8 (Dα〈z〉). For an SBox S with α as the input, Dα〈z〉 is defined as: Dα〈z〉 =
{fault value d : z is a solution to S(x)⊕S(x⊕d) = ∆(α, d)}, where z is an arbitrary input
value.
So, for d ∈ Dα〈z〉, we have, ∆(α, d) = S(α)⊕S(α⊕ d) = S(z)⊕S(z⊕ d) = ∆(z, d). In
other words, the attacker will not be able to distinguish α from z under fault d ∈ Dα〈z〉.
Lemma 4. Suppose, for the SBox S, S(x) ⊕ S(x ⊕ δ) = ∆(α, δ) has exactly 2m + 2
solutions, {α, α ⊕ δ, β1, β1 ⊕ δ, . . . , βm, βm ⊕ δ} where 2m + 2 ≥ 4. Then for any fault d
( 6= δ), define d∗ as d∗ = d⊕ δ. We show the following results:
(i) d ∈ Dα〈α⊕ δ〉 =⇒ d∗ ∈ Dα〈α⊕ δ〉;
(ii) d ∈ Dα〈βi〉 =⇒ d∗ ∈ Dα〈βi〉, for i = 1, . . . ,m;
(iii) d ∈ Dα〈α⊕ δ〉 ∩Dα〈βi〉 =⇒ d∗ ∈ Dα〈α⊕ δ〉 ∩Dα〈βi〉, for i = 1, . . . ,m.
Proof. Under fault d, we have:
∆(α, d) = S(α)⊕ S(α⊕ d)
∆(α⊕ δ, d) = S(α⊕ δ)⊕ S(α⊕ δ ⊕ d)
∆(βi, d) = S(βi)⊕ S(βi ⊕ d)
∆(βi ⊕ δ, d) = S(βi ⊕ δ)⊕ S(βi ⊕ δ ⊕ d)
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If (i) holds, then, ∆(α, d) = ∆(α⊕ δ, d); if (ii) holds, then, ∆(βi, d) = ∆(βi ⊕ δ, d); if
(iii) holds, then, ∆(α, d) = ∆(α⊕ δ, d) = ∆(βi, d) = ∆(βi ⊕ δ, d).
Similarly, under fault d∗ = d⊕ δ, we have:
∆(α, d∗) = S(α)⊕ S(α⊕ d∗) = S(α)⊕ S(α⊕ δ ⊕ d)
∆(α⊕ δ, d∗) = S(α⊕ δ)⊕ S(α⊕ δ ⊕ d∗) = S(α⊕ δ)⊕ S(α⊕ d)
∆(βi, d
∗) = S(βi)⊕ S(βi ⊕ d∗) = S(βi)⊕ S(βi ⊕ δ ⊕ d)
∆(βi ⊕ δ, d∗) = S(βi ⊕ δ)⊕ S(βi ⊕ δ ⊕ d∗) = S(βi ⊕ δ)⊕ S(βi ⊕ d)
So, using previous relations, if (i) holds, then, ∆(α, d∗) = ∆(α⊕ δ, d∗); if (ii) holds, then,
∆(βi, d
∗) = ∆(βi ⊕ δ, d∗); if (iii) holds, then, ∆(α, d∗) = ∆(α ⊕ δ, d∗) = ∆(βi, d∗) =
∆(βi ⊕ δ, d∗). ut
Proof of Theorem 2. For m = 0, we have the result from Theorem 4. So in the following,
we consider m ≥ 1. For the input α and for the fault δ, the output difference is S(α)⊕
S(α ⊕ δ) = ∆(α, δ). Suppose S(x) ⊕ S(x ⊕ δ) = ∆(α, δ), has exactly 2m + 2 solutions:
{α, α ⊕ δ, β1, β1 ⊕ δ, . . . , βm, βm ⊕ δ}. We will show that there exists a set of m + 1
faults {δ′, δ1, . . . , δm} such that S(x)⊕ S(x⊕ δ) = ∆(α, δ); S(x)⊕ S(x⊕ δ′) = ∆(α, δ′);
S(x)⊕S(x⊕ δ1) = ∆(α, δ1); . . .; and S(x)⊕S(x⊕ δm) = ∆(α, δm) have only one common
solution α; i.e., Sα〈δ〉 ∩ Sα〈δ′〉 ∩ Sα〈δ1〉 ∩ · · · ∩ Sα〈δm〉 = {α}. So, to uniquely identify α,
one needs not more than m+ 2 faults: {δ, δ′, δ1, . . . , δm}.
Since, all of {α, α⊕ δ, β1, β1 ⊕ δ, . . . , βm, βm ⊕ δ} are solutions of ∆(α, δ); we have:
∆(α, δ) = S(α)⊕ S(α⊕ δ) = ∆(α⊕ δ, δ)
= ∆(βi, δ) = S(βi)⊕ S(βi ⊕ δ) = ∆(βi ⊕ δ, δ); for i = 1, . . . ,m. (1)
Consider the two sets of faults Dα〈α ⊕ δ〉 and Dαβ =
⋃m
i=1Dα〈βi〉. Note that δ ∈
Dα〈α⊕ δ〉 ∩ (
⋂m
i=1Dα〈βi〉). Hence, none of the sets is empty. Define ΩS to be the set of
all 2n − 1 faults. We now treat rest of the proof in two cases.
Case 1. Dα〈α⊕ δ〉 ∪Dαβ 6= ΩS .
Consider a δ′ ∈ ΩS \ (Dα〈α⊕ δ〉 ∪Dαβ), then the equations, S(x)⊕S(x⊕ δ) = ∆(α, δ)
and S(x) ⊕ S(x ⊕ δ′) = ∆(α, δ′) will have α as a solution and βi ⊕ δ’s could be other
solution(s). If no βi⊕ δ appears as a solution, then the two faults δ and δ′ would be enough
to determine α uniquely.
Now suppose that, for a set of i’s, each of βi ⊕ δ is also included in the solution.
Then, for each i, there must be one fault δi ∈ ΩS such that βi ⊕ δ is not a solution of
S(x) ⊕ S(x ⊕ δi) = ∆(α, δi); i.e., βi ⊕ δ /∈ Sα〈δi〉. Otherwise if both α and βi ⊕ δ were
common solutions of S(x)⊕S(x⊕d) = ∆(α, d) for all input difference d; then by Lemma 1,
α⊕ βi ⊕ δ would be a linear structure of S; which is a contradiction. Therefore, these (at
most m+ 2) faults; δ, δ′ and δi’s will uniquely determine α.
Case 2. Dα〈α⊕ δ〉 ∪Dαβ = ΩS .
First, we prove, Dαβ is not a subset of Dα〈α⊕ δ〉. If possible, assume Dαβ ⊆ Dα〈α⊕ δ〉.
Since, Dα〈α⊕ δ〉 ∪Dαβ = ΩS by assumption; we have Dα〈α⊕ δ〉 = ΩS , implying δ is a
linear structure; which is a contradiction. Hence, Dαβ \Dα〈α⊕ δ〉 is non-empty.
Consider the fault: δ′ ∈ Dαβ \Dα〈α⊕ δ〉. So, Sα〈δ〉∩Sα〈δ′〉 can contain βi’s or βi⊕ δ’s
along with α (but not α⊕ δ).
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Next, we prove, βi⊕ δ /∈ Sα〈δ〉∩Sα〈δ′〉 by showing βi⊕ δ /∈ Sα〈δ′〉 for any i. Otherwise,
if βi ⊕ δ ∈ Sα〈δ′〉 for some i, then, ∆(α, δ′) = ∆(βi ⊕ δ, δ′); i.e.,
S(α)⊕ S(α⊕ δ′) = S(βi ⊕ δ)⊕ S(βi ⊕ δ ⊕ δ′)
=⇒ S(α⊕ δ′)⊕ S(βi ⊕ δ ⊕ δ′) = S(α)⊕ S(βi ⊕ δ)
= S(α⊕ δ)⊕ S(βi),using Equation (1)
=⇒ S(α⊕ δ)⊕ S(α⊕ δ′) = S(βi)⊕ S(βi ⊕ δ ⊕ δ′)
=⇒ δ ⊕ δ′ ∈ Dα〈α⊕ δ〉 ∩Dα〈βi〉
Notice from Lemma 4 that, if δ⊕ δ′ ∈ Dα〈α⊕ δ〉∩Dα〈βi〉, then so will be (δ⊕ δ′)⊕ δ = δ′,
which is a contradiction, as δ′ ∈ Dαβ \Dα〈α⊕ δ〉.
So, with faults δ and δ′, assume we have α and βi’s in the solution, for a set of i’s. Now,
consider fault(s) δi ∈ ΩS \Dα〈βi〉. Consequently, the intersection, Sα〈δ〉 ∩ Sα〈δ′〉 ∩ Sα〈δi〉,
cannot contain any of {α⊕ δ, βi, βi ⊕ δ}. Besides, such fault δi exists; otherwise, we will
have, Dα〈βi〉 = ΩS , implying α⊕ βi is a linear structure; which is a contradiction. ut
Theorem 5. [Extension of [28, Appendix A.1]] Consider an n× n SBox S with input α.
Suppose, upon applying two distinct faults δ1 and δ2, α is not uniquely retrieved; since,
α⊕ δ ∈ Sα〈δ1〉 ∩ Sα〈δ2〉 (δ 6= δ1, δ2).
(i) If δ = δ1 ⊕ δ2:
α, α⊕ δ1, α⊕ δ2, α⊕ δ1 ⊕ δ2 ∈ Sα〈δ1〉 ∩ Sα〈δ2〉 ∩ Sα〈δ1 ⊕ δ2〉.
Hence, |Sα〈δ1〉|, |Sα〈δ2〉| and |Sα〈δ1 ⊕ δ2〉| ≥ 4.
(ii) Else:
α, α⊕ δi, α⊕ δ, α⊕ δ ⊕ δi ∈ Sα〈δi〉 for i = 1, 2.
α, α⊕ δ, α⊕ δ1, α⊕ δ2, α⊕ δ ⊕ δ1, α⊕ δ ⊕ δ2 ∈ Sα〈δ〉.
Hence, |Sα〈δ1〉|, |Sα〈δ2〉| ≥ 4 and |Sα〈δ〉| ≥ 6.
Proof. We have,
S(α)⊕ S(α⊕ δ1) = ∆(α, δ1) = ∆(α⊕ δ, δ1) = S(α⊕ δ)⊕ S(α⊕ δ ⊕ δ1),
S(α)⊕ S(α⊕ δ2) = ∆(α, δ2) = ∆(α⊕ δ, δ2) = S(α⊕ δ)⊕ S(α⊕ δ ⊕ δ2),
=⇒ S(α⊕ δ1)⊕ S(α⊕ δ2) = S(α⊕ δ ⊕ δ1)⊕ S(α⊕ δ ⊕ δ2).
(i) Given, δ = δ1 ⊕ δ2. Now we have, S(α) ⊕ S(α ⊕ δ1) = S(α ⊕ δ2) ⊕ S(α ⊕ δ1 ⊕ δ2)
=⇒ α⊕ δ2, α⊕ δ1 ⊕ δ2 ∈ Sα〈δ1〉.
Again, S(α)⊕S(α⊕ δ2) = S(α⊕ δ1)⊕S(α⊕ δ1⊕ δ2) =⇒ α⊕ δ1, α⊕ δ1⊕ δ2 ∈ Sα〈δ2〉.
Also, S(α)⊕ S(α ⊕ δ1) = S(α ⊕ δ2)⊕ S(α ⊕ δ1 ⊕ δ2) =⇒ S(α)⊕ S(α ⊕ δ1 ⊕ δ2) =
S(α⊕ δ1)⊕ S(α⊕ δ2) =⇒ α⊕ δ1, α⊕ δ2 ∈ Sα〈δ1 ⊕ δ2〉.
(ii) δ 6= δ1 ⊕ δ2.
We get, S(α)⊕ S(α⊕ δi) = S(α⊕ δ)⊕ S(α⊕ δ ⊕ δi) =⇒ α⊕ δ, α⊕ δ ⊕ δi ∈ Sα〈δi〉;
for i = 1, 2.
Next, S(α)⊕ S(α ⊕ δ) = S(α ⊕ δ1)⊕ S(α ⊕ δ ⊕ δ1) =⇒ α ⊕ δ1, α⊕ δ ⊕ δ1 ∈ Sα〈δ〉.
Similarly, α⊕ δ2, α⊕ δ ⊕ δ2 ∈ Sα〈δ〉. ut
Example 1. The SBox 80A23517496BCDEF (the representative of class # 293 in [20]) has
a linear structure at a = 2, which can be seen from its DDT in Table 10(a). Zeros, and the
rows-columns corresponding to δ = 0 and ∆ = 0 are not shown here for the sake of better
clarity. Table 10(b) gives the S0〈δ〉 for varying δ on S.
Example 2. Take the SBox 20135467A98BCDEF (# 288 in [20]). Notice from the expanded
DDT (Table 11) that, for fault δ = 1 (column 3), we have, S8〈1〉 = S9〈1〉 = Sa〈1〉 =
Sb〈1〉 = {8, 9, a, b}.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f
1 4 4 4 4
2 16
3 4 4 4 4
4 4 4 4 4
5 4 4 4 4
6 4 4 4 4
7 4 4 4 4
8 4 4 4 4
9 4 4 4 4
a 4 4 4 4
b 4 4 4 4
c 4 4 4 4
d 4 4 4 4
e 4 4 4 4
f 4 4 4 4
(b) Effect of fault for input α = 0
δ S0〈δ〉 |S0〈δ〉|
1 0, 1, 2, 3 4
2 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, a, b, c, d, e, f 16
3 0, 1, 2, 3 4
4 0, 2, 4, 6 4
5 0, 2, 5, 7 4
6 0, 2, 4, 6 4
7 0, 2, 5, 7 4
8 0, 2, 8, a 4
9 0, 2, 9, b 4
a 0, 2, 8, a 4
b 0, 2, 9, b 4
c 0, 2, c, e 4
d 0, 2, d, f 4
e 0, 2, c, e 4
f 0, 2, d, f 4
Table 11: Expanded DDT for SBox 20135467A98BCDEF
δ
∆
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f
1 4567cdef 0123 89ab
2 89abcdef 01234567
3 012389ab 4567 cdef
4 13579bdf 8ace 0246
5 13469bce 0257 8adf
6 02468ace 9bdf 1357
7 02578adf 1346 9bce
8 03678bef 12459acd
9 45cd 67ef 128b 039a
a 03679acd 12458bef
b 129a 038b 45ef 67cd
c 37bf 159d 06ac 248e
d 149c 36be 258f 07ad
e 068e 24ac 379d 15bf
f 25ad 078f 14be 369c
Example 3. Consider the previous SBox 20135467A98BCDEF (expanded DDT is in Table
11). Assume the input, α = 8 . If an attacker inserts the fault values δ1 = d and then
δ2 = 1, then he is able to uniquely retrieve the input α = 8; since S8〈d〉 ∩ S8〈1〉 =
{2, 5, 8, f} ∩ {8, 9, a, b} = {8}. So, MinF20135467A98BCDEF(8) = 2.
Example 4 (Theorem 5(ii)). Consider the SBox 20135467A98BCDEF whose expanded DDT
is in Table 11. Let, α = 8, δ1 = 1, δ2 = 4 with δ = 2 6= δ1 ⊕ δ2. We have |Sδ1〈α〉| =
|{8, 9, a, b}| = 4 and |Sδ2〈α〉| = |{8, a, c, e}| = 4 and |Sδ〈α〉| = |{8, 9, a, b, c, d, e, f}| ≥ 6.
B Test Vectors for DEFAULT
In Table 12, we provide a few test vectors for the 80-round cipher DEFAULT (i.e., with the
DEFAULT-LAYER – DEFAULT-CORE – DEFAULT-LAYER construction).
C Visual Representation of Two Rounds of DEFAULT-LAYER
We recall in Table 13 the GIFT-128 bit permutation that is used in our constructions.
The structure of DEFAULT-LAYER for two rounds is shown (out of 28 rounds in
DEFAULT-LAYER) in the Figure 3. The structure for the DEFAULT-CORE is also similar.
The SBoxes are numbered (from 0 to 31), so are the bit positions (from 0 to 127), for better
clarity. The colored lines indicate the permutation (linear) layer. By
⊕
, it is indicated
that the corresponding key bits are XORed. The round constant additions are shown by⊕
(bits at 3, 7, 11, 15, 19, 23), and the bit at 127 is flipped in each round.
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Table 13: Specifications of GIFT-128 Bit Permutation.
i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
P128(i) 0 33 66 99 96 1 34 67 64 97 2 35 32 65 98 3
i 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
P128(i) 4 37 70 103 100 5 38 71 68 101 6 39 36 69 102 7
i 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47
P128(i) 8 41 74 107 104 9 42 75 72 105 10 43 40 73 106 11
i 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
P128(i) 12 45 78 111 108 13 46 79 76 109 14 47 44 77 110 15
i 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79
P128(i) 16 49 82 115 112 17 50 83 80 113 18 51 48 81 114 19
i 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
P128(i) 20 53 86 119 116 21 54 87 84 117 22 55 52 85 118 23
i 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111
P128(i) 24 57 90 123 120 25 58 91 88 121 26 59 56 89 122 27
i 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 3: Structure of DEFAULT-LAYER (two rounds only)
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D MILP modeling
As our special SBox with linear structures has probability 1 differential transitions (resp.,
± 12 linear bias). For the differential case, the above mentioned approach will always yield
an MEDP bound of εd = 1 (1 is raised to the power of an integer), which naturally signifies
the smallest possible protection against differential attacks (the attack succeeds with
only one chosen input difference or two chosen inputs). In case of linear cryptanalysis, it
can be shown that the overall bias εl, considering only ± 12 biases (and assuming mutual
independence of the biases), is 12 . This is obtained by substituting εi =
1
2 ∀i in [42, Lemma
3.1]. Similar to the differential case, this also leads to the smallest protection against linear
attack (the attack succeeds with roughly 1/ε2l = 4 known inputs). Naturally, we need to
devise a way to count precisely the number of probability 12 differential transitions and
± 14 linear biases.
To overcome this problem, we devise a new strategy which is inspired from the concept
of indicator constraint used in linear programming (also known as the big M method),
where a large constant M is chosen. In our case, it is sufficient to choose M being equal to
twice the SBox size (= 8), similar to [1]. We would like to note that the MILP modeling
used here is the first-of-its-kind for its compatibility with LS SBoxes. Our basic idea is to
minimize the number of active SBoxes with differential probability 12 (resp., ±
1
4 linear bias)
while keeping the probability 1 differential transitions (resp., ± 12 linear bias) unrestricted
for a particular number of rounds. The problem can be formulated as an MILP problem
whose solution can be obtained by a standard solver. Upon getting the solution, let us
denote the number active SBoxes with differential probability 1 by o and that of differential
probability 12 by h. Then, the MEDP can be computed as 1
o × ( 12 )
h = 2−h and hence
the attacker needs at least 2h chosen differences [42, Chapter 3.4], which translates to
21+h chosen inputs for the layer. To compute the MELP, let us assume the number of
active SBoxes with ± 12 bias is o and that with ±
1
4 is h. Then, we substitute with εi =
1
2
or with εi =
1
4 accordingly to get εl = 2
o+h−1 × ( 12 )
o × ( 14 )
h = 2−h−1. Hence the attacker
needs roughly 1/ε2l = 2
2h+2 known inputs [42, Chapter 3.3]. Of course, the probability 1
differential transitions as well as the ± 12 linear biases do not play any role in the search
complexity.
In the following, we describe the MILP modeling in details for the differential case.
The MILP formulation for the linear case is much alike, hence we skip the details for
conciseness (the main differences is that in the linear case the absolute values for the biases
are considered). More information about this modeling can be found in [5].
Assume that there are qp transitions for a given probability p (1 ≥ p > 0). For example,
there are three probability 1 transitions for an SBox with three non-zero LS, hence q1 = 3.
First, for the ith SBox (i = 0, 1, . . . , 31) at the jth round (j = 0, 1, . . . , η− 1), we create
the following Boolean variables:
Qi,j to indicate it is active;
Qpi,j to indicate if it takes a probability p trail;
Qpi,j,l, for l = 0, . . . , qp − 1 to indicate which among the qp trails


















i,j) to indicate the output difference.














i,j to keep track which probability p trail
if active;





i,j,l to check precisely which p probability
trail is chosen.
32
After this, eachQpi,j,l is used to model respective transitions. For example, the probability
1 transition (6, a) is the l = 2 trail, it is modelled as: MQ1i,j,2 ≥ (x0i,j) + (1− x1i,j) + (1−
x2i,j) + (x
3
i,j) + (1− y0i,j) + (y1i,j) + (1− y2i,j) + (y3i,j). Basically, each negative literal is taken
as is, and each positive literal is subtracted from 1, then added together.
Also, we have to set a non-zero initial input difference to at least one variable at the







The last set of constraints comes from the bit permutation layer. For each round from
1 to η − 1 (for j = 1, . . . , η − 1), 128 equality constraints are inserted. For example, the
second entry in the permutation (1→ 33) is modeled as x18,j = y10,j−1.







p<1 (− log2 p)×Q
p
i,j .
E Hardware Implementation Diagrams
Figures 4 and 5 show the architectures of the implementations reported in Section 8.1.
State




Fig. 4: The hardware architecture of the DEFAULT design (in case of GIFT-128 cipher, the core
sbox layer is replaced with GIFT-128 sbox)
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Key
Fig. 5: The hardware architecture of AES protected with DEFAULT-LAYER. N can be 1, 2 or 4.
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